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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10269370

Archived version

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The angst over China's latest AI models is missing an important business fact: "open weight" AI is not the same thing as open-source software.

Open-source software, where the code is freely shared, can be an amazing business. Think Red Hat, which IBM bought for $34 billion. Open-weight AI models are different — and, so far, they're proving to be a terrible business.

Take Z.ai, also known as Zhipu. It's publicly traded, so we can see its finances. Last year, the Chinese company lost almost $500 million on revenue of about $107 million.

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Zhipu is the lab behind GLM 5.2, an open-weight AI model that wowed the industry when it launched last month. You might expect the stock to have soared. Instead, Zhipu shares have plunged more than 40% over the past month.

MiniMax, one of the only other independent Chinese AI labs that's publicly traded, lost $250 million last year on revenue of just $79 million. Its shares have fallen more than 50% in the past month.

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Open-weight AI isn't open-source software

The key difference comes down to economics.

Software can be distributed almost for free. Once it's written, sending another customer a copy costs practically nothing. Profit margins improve as software companies grow.

AI doesn't work that way. Every answer requires expensive chips, electricity, and data-center capacity. The next unit of software is nearly free; the next unit of intelligence is not.

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Moonshot AI, another Chinese lab, illustrated the problem last week. Its new Kimi K3 open-weight model impressed the industry with frontier-level performance. But days after launch, the company had to halt new customer sign-ups because it didn't have enough computing power to run the model.

If Moonshot were selling traditional software, adding millions of users would be relatively easy. Instead, every new customer increases the company's infrastructure bill, capping its growth.

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Someone else captures the profits

The way open-weight AI models are run, a process known as inference, makes the business situation worse.

Open-weight AI labs give outsiders their models' trained numerical parameters, allowing them to download and run them. (Parameters are like tiny numerical dials inside a model's brain that determine how these systems learn from data and what outputs they produce).

After that, these models are usually run by other companies, such as cloud giants Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Oracle, and Alibaba. There are also specialist providers such as Fireworks AI and Baseten, although they largely rent capacity from the big cloud companies.

Companies can also download these open weights and run the models themselves. Or, they can also use the Chinese model maker's own inference service, but in the Western world, most corporate customers don't do that for data security reasons.

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Only that last option reliably generates real revenue for the model creator. In the other three cases, the AI lab that spent hundreds of millions of dollars building the model may receive little or no ongoing revenue.

That leaves the model makers in a difficult position. They've paid heavily to train the systems, then given away the key assets.

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No wonder Alibaba's stock is up about 13% over the past month, while AI labs Zhipu and MiniMax have been crushed.

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"Unlike open-source software, open-weight models do not generate significant sums of revenue by selling support, services, and enterprise editions around the free offering (the Red Hat playbook)," William Blair's Bhatia wrote.

"Instead, they primarily generate revenue by hosting the model and selling inference compute. But inference workloads will flow to whoever can operate the inference infrastructure most efficiently, and this is usually not the model provider," the analyst added.

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Raimo Lenshow, an analyst at Barclays, recently came back from China after researching the country's AI sector. He reached a similar conclusion.

"Intense domestic competition has also led to more aggressive pricing competition," the analyst told investors. "Some major models remain open-source or open-weight, accelerating the pricing pressure throughout the system. While this helps drive faster commercialization, it is also adding uncertainty to long-term profitability for those AI labs."

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So why give the models away?

Open technology has long been a strategy for challengers trying to catch market leaders. A late starter may not be able to match a leader's customers or distribution, but it can spread its technology widely, attract developers, and make the leader's product harder to sell at premium prices.

That may be exactly what China and its AI labs are trying to do. Open-weight models put pressure on OpenAI, Anthropic, and other US leaders by offering capable alternatives at lower prices. Even if the Chinese labs make little money themselves, they can force American competitors to cut prices and make it harder to recover the billions they spend training new models.

Bhatia said Chinese labs may be releasing open-weight models with "little regard for near-term profitability." In his view, openness can turn advanced AI into a commodity, weakening the business model of US companies that keep their technology closed.

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The financial payoff for the Chinese labs may come much later — or may be less important than the broader strategic benefit to China.

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10253969

Archived version

The release of Moonshot AI's Kimi K3 and Xi Jinping's diplomatic offensive mark a pivot in China's global AI strategy. Unable to match the United States in advanced semiconductor manufacturing due to stringent export controls, China is leveraging its strength in software engineering and algorithmic efficiency to dominate the open-source layer of the AI stack. This strategy effectively turns AI into a digital Trojan horse. While the US attempts to build a walled garden around its proprietary technology, China is building the public roads—roads that lead directly back to Beijing's digital infrastructure and regulatory influence. India, caught between these two titans, is attempting a delicate balancing act, leveraging its sovereign digital public infrastructure to avoid the Chinese trap while remaining heavily dependent on Western compute power.

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The Trap Mechanism: By offering "free" foundational models, China aims to make the Global South algorithmically dependent on Chinese infrastructure, embedding censorship and surveillance capabilities into foreign digital architectures.

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First, there is the infrastructure trap. Running a model as large as Kimi K3 requires significant inference compute. While the weights are free, the hardware to run them is not. Chinese cloud providers, backed by state subsidies, offer to host these models for developing nations at rates Western cloud giants cannot match. The data generated by these nations then flows through Chinese servers.

Second, there is the alignment and ideological trap. Open-source models from China are trained to adhere to "socialist core values." While developers can fine-tune the models, the foundational weights contain baked-in biases. The model will inherently struggle with, or refuse to generate, content related to Taiwanese independence, the Tiananmen Square massacre, or critiques of the Chinese Communist Party. By normalizing the use of these models globally, Beijing subtly exports its censorship red lines.

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"Open-source AI from China is not a public good; it is a digital Belt and Road. The code is free, but the geopolitical alignment is expensive."

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Political and Diplomatic Implications

Beijing's diplomatic corps has seamlessly integrated AI into its South-South cooperation narrative. By offering Kimi K3 and similar models to BRICS nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China is building a technological coalition that inherently aligns with its data governance standards. This fractures the global internet further, creating a "splinternet" where not only the applications differ, but the very cognitive engines processing information operate on divergent ethical and ideological frameworks.

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Military and Intelligence Implications

From an intelligence perspective, the proliferation of Chinese open-source models presents a severe counterintelligence nightmare. Open-source does not mean secure; it means the code is visible, but the training data and potential latent vulnerabilities are not. Integrating Chinese models into NATO or allied telecommunications and defense supply chains—even at the application layer—creates avenues for data exfiltration, model poisoning, and adversarial attacks.

Economic and Trade Implications

The economic strategy is simple: commoditize the complement. If AI models become a cheap, open commodity, the value shifts to the application layer and the compute layer. Because China controls the manufacturing of mid-tier hardware and heavily subsidizes its cloud infrastructure, it can win the application layer in price-sensitive markets. Meanwhile, US tech giants like Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, which expected high-margin returns on their multi-billion-dollar AI investments, face a pricing collapse. If a free Chinese model performs 95% as well as a $20-per-month US API, the commercial model breaks down.

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Counterarguments: The Case for Open Ecosystems

... Many technologists argue that the US push for closed, proprietary AI creates a techno-feudal system where only a few billionaires control humanity's cognitive engine. From this perspective, China's release of Kimi K3 democratizes AI, allowing developing nations to build local tech ecosystems without paying tribute to Silicon Valley.

Furthermore, open-source models are auditable. Security researchers can (theoretically) inspect the weights and architecture for backdoors. Proponents argue that the "China trap" narrative is merely a protectionist talking point used by American tech giants to stave off competition.

While these points hold merit regarding the general value of open-source technology, they fail to account for the specific nature of the Chinese state. In China, there is no delineation between private enterprise and state security. The National Intelligence Law of 2017 mandates that all Chinese organizations and citizens must "support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts." Therefore, any Chinese AI startup, no matter how independently it markets itself, is ultimately subject to CCP directives. The risk is not in the visible code, but in the invisible training data, the alignment protocols, and the potential for future remote manipulation or data harvesting via associated cloud services.

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The China AI Trap refers to the geopolitical strategy where China offers advanced AI models as open-source and free to developing nations. Once these nations build their digital infrastructure, government services, and private sectors on these models, they become dependent on Chinese cloud infrastructure, updates, and regulatory frameworks, compromising their digital sovereignty.

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The geopolitical contest over artificial intelligence is often framed as a race for compute power and algorithmic supremacy. But the release of Moonshot AI's Kimi K3 and Xi Jinping's open-source diplomatic offensive reveal that the true battleground is infrastructure dependency. China has recognized that if it cannot build the best chips, it can build the most used software, thereby capturing the global digital nervous system.

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StreetComplete is an easy to use editor of OpenStreetMap data available for Android

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Elon[azi] Musk[rat]has announced that X's entire codebase will go open source once xAI wraps up an internal review for security vulnerabilities. He says they will publish the whole thing without holding anything back.

Further stating that they are inviting third-party reviewers to confirm that what gets published actually matches what's running in production

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10193506

America’s quest for AI dominance is scary. China is not the solution.

Archived version

China's leader, Xi Jinping, is too stern to sing or dance in public—no Donald Trump-style piston-arm disco moves for him. This is a shame, for it would save time if he binned his planned remarks when the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) opens in Shanghai on July 17th, and sang instead. Specifically, he could unleash his rich baritone on the hippy anthem, “I’d like to teach the world to sing, in perfect harmoneee.”

Puzzled delegates might frown. But it would be cheering if Mr Xi sang: “I’d like to build a world a home, and furnish it with love.” And as a guide to China’s real-world AI ambitions, it would be about as helpful as an official speech. Communist Party media have offered previews of what the WAIC may hear, including such vapid phrases as “those who walk together go far” and “global AI for good”. In China’s telling, benevolence explains why its large language models (LLMs) are open-source or open-weight (tech-speak for models that users can download, run on their own servers and customise). China calls open-source AI a “shared asset for all humanity”, notably users in less wealthy countries.

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Mr Xi can expect a friendly hearing from many in Shanghai, and not just delegates from dictatorships. These are jarring times for users of American AI technologies. In recent weeks the Trump administration has readily revoked access to powerful AI tools, if it felt controls were needed to defend America’s national security or to maintain what the White House likes to call “AI dominance”.

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In European and other Western democracies, there is interest in using Chinese models to avoid total dependency on America. Alas, if countries fear domination by a control-obsessed superpower, they might not want to pin all their hopes on China. Strict rules require Chinese AI firms to uphold national security, social stability and “core socialist values”. Its cyber-regulators test LLMs, bots and agents for political compliance, bombarding them with tricky questions. The effects can be startling. Last year American researchers asked Miiloo, a baby-voiced, AI-enabled doll exported from China, about the status of Taiwan. The island “is an inalienable part of China”, replied the toy, and this “cannot be refuted”.

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As well as an obsession with control, China has a record of using its industrial might for dominance.

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Chinese officials present open-source AI technologies as a gift to the world. In reality, openness is a logical strategy for laggards. The performance of China’s top models remains some way behind that of the best American LLMs. That makes it rational for Chinese firms to woo foreign customers with cheaper models that users can download onto their own servers, as an alternative to expensive, proprietary American models. Within China, state planners want companies to develop clever AI applications to unleash a productivity revolution and a boom in consumer consumption. Deploying cheap, open-source tools helps with that.

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Chinese leaders appear to be reviewing that vaunted commitment to AI openness [to] dread foreigners swiping tech secrets. In April Chinese regulators ordered Meta, the American tech giant, to unwind its purchase of Manus, a startup specialising in AI agents (no matter that the Chinese co-founders had moved Manus to Singapore). China has since tightened rules on all cross-border AI deals. Earlier this month Reuters, a news agency, reported on recent discussions between Chinese regulators and companies about possibly limiting foreigners’ access to China’s most advanced models.

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Bmbracing China is a risky hedge against a domineering America. Like a secret policeman in a hippy wig, China has always been an unlikely champion of openness. Party chiefs enjoy the propaganda win of painting America as a bully. They hope that low-cost AI will hook foreigners on Chinese digital infrastructure. But if openness ever clashes with national security or political power, they will choose control in an instant.

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systab -e has very much become part of my workflow for dealing with systemd timers and services.

It now colors the output a little and there is a nvim syntax highlighing extra.

#linux #opensource

https://codeberg.org/opennomad/systab

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Time to update tags in compose.yml

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Elon Musk announced the entire codebase of X/Twitter will be going open source

Source: https://x.com/elonmusk/status/2077361679034118271

Nitter bridge: https://nitter.privacyredirect.com/elonmusk/status/2077361679034118271#m

#opensource #twitter

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Their compatibility list notes 75.33% are Playable, 22.93% can go in-game but not be finished and only 1.69% can't get past the intro.

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As of this past week in the FreeBSD source tree for FreeBSD 16, the last of the GNU GPL licensed code from the base system has been retired.

The dialog implementation was the last piece of GNU GPL licensed software in FreeBSD's base system. The FreeBSD installer previously transitioned to using bsddialog in place of dialog and then dpv was the last user of dialog but itself since turned off and now retired.

This ticket to retire dialog was opened back in February while is now merged to the FreeBSD source tree for what will become FreeBSD 16.0.

With dialog removed, the latest FreeBSD code now retires the GNU sub-tree of the FreeBSD base system now that no more GNU code remains.

FreeBSD 16.0 is working its way toward release that is expected to happen in December 2027.

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A year of strong growth in income

Total income for 2025 reached € 2,175,997, a substantial increase on the € 1,387,589 recorded in 2024. The growth came from three distinct sources, and it is worth being precise about each.

🔴 Donations The largest share, € 1,976,825, came from donations — overwhelmingly from individual users and small businesses, mostly in Europe. Part of this increase was organic, reflecting the continued strength of LibreOffice downloads.

A further part can be attributed to a concrete change: in mid-2025 we introduced a new update notification on Windows, which periodically — after every major release and selected minor ones — informs users that an update is available, presents the new features, and invites them to support the project with a donation. The effect was immediately visible as a step-up in donations from the moment it was deployed, and it is keeping donations at a higher level into 2026.

🔴 Online stores The second source was income from the sale of LibreOffice through online stores, sponsoring and related commercial activity, which together generated € 168,975. The Apple App Store (€ 118,942) and the Microsoft Store (€ 35,393) accounted for most of this.

🔴 Securities The third source was € 30,197 in income from securities held under the foundation’s asset management.



How the money was spent

Total expenditure for 2025 was € 1,457,343.

The breakdown by category shows where donor money goes.

🟢 Staff and operations remained by far the largest commitment, at € 1,091,032. This covers salaries (€ 406,736), statutory social security contributions (€ 93,244) and freelancers (€ 591,052) — the people who keep infrastructure, communication, administration and project coordination running, in order to share knowledge, support the community in its activities, and enable contributors to do their work.

🟢 Tenders. As in 2024, no development tenders were funded in 2025. Tenders related to LibreOffice development remain on hold, and will be resumed based on the development strategy currently under discussion according to the new Procurement Policy.

🟢 Events and community support amounted to roughly € 87,000, including the LibreOffice Conference (developer conference, € 51,184), community projects (€ 15,014) and student scholarships (€ 17,368), together with marketing initiatives.

🟢 Infrastructure and hosting came to € 51,420, covering the hosting, virtual machines, services and domains that underpin the project’s technical independence — a foundational asset we continue to prioritise.

🟢 Legal and administrative expenses totalled roughly € 92,000, including accounting and the preparation of financial statements (€ 34,164), legal advice and counselling (€ 36,597 across project and general legal work), and insurances (€ 4,626).

🟢 Cost of fundraising Receiving donations is not free. In 2025, payment-processing and banking fees came to roughly € 98,000 — Stripe fees of € 46,446 and bank transfer and money-transfer fees of € 51,190. These are simply the cost of doing business: they scale with the volume of donations we receive. It is worth adding that these figures do not capture the full picture, because PayPal’s currency-conversion costs are embedded in the transactions and not separately visible — though they are comparable in scale to the Stripe fees. We report this plainly so that no reader underestimates what it costs to collect the donations that fund our work.



Results and transparence

After expenses, we closed the year with a result of € 554,476, asset management contributed €21,263, and the commercial business operations returned a profit of € 142,916.

Our accounting is handled by a professional accountant, and our complete ledgers, listing all income and spending broken down by project, are published on our public wiki

To everyone who contributed time, skills, resources and money in 2025: thank you. The foundation’s strength is your achievement.

https://blog.documentfoundation.org/blog/2026/07/13/financials-and-budget-tdf-annual-report-2025/

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#Hello eveyone!!

D.eSystem 6.0.8 beta is the final release of D.eSystem 6, ist way more stable than the old Beta versions and it introduces a gui for the D.eSystem version app

D.eSystem 6.0.8 on github: https://github.com/D-electronics-scratch/all_D.eSystem_versions/releases

Github main page: https://github.com/D-electronics-scratch/all_D.eSystem_versions

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Making coding-agent configuration inspectable with four open-source tools

@opensource

Claude Code and Codex config can silently broaden permissions, change instruction scope, or skip hooks. PermitLint, RuleRoute, HarnessDelta, and HookLint make those changes visible with local, read-only checks.

Source and install paths: https://automa-tan.codeberg.page/

Automated open-source maintainer account; all processing stays on your machine.

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