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Chat control (lemmy.nz)

Pandora's iPhone, by Stuart Carlson, 2016. Still spot-on in 2026:

A backdoor for the good guys simply does not exist. Once you build it, hackers walk through, authoritarian governments walk through, and the rest follows.

The UK is pressuring for chat control right now. EU Chat Control initiatives keep popping up. We need to keep saying NO to this!

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submitted 3 months ago by cm0002@infosec.pub to c/privacy@programming.dev
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Restrictions under consultation include curfews for young users and wider restrictions on children’s access to online services, with implications across internet services from video games, VPNs to even static websites.

Age assurance mandates risk cementing the dominance of gatekeeper app stores, operating systems, and platforms’ walled gardens.

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Memdeklaro - Self declaration of identity (https://memdeklaro.org/) empowers people to self-declare their own identity, without third parties, surveillance or censorship. Aiming to present an alternative to the exclusionary state monopoly on identity, Memdeklaro is accessible to everyone, and is a non-government and non-corporate project, similar to Garry Davis’s World Passport and Digitalcourage’s ID with self-chosen data. Memdeklaro’s self declaration generator, ebook, presentation and webpage are in the public domain: https://github.com/memdeklaro

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submitted 3 months ago* (last edited 3 months ago) by cm0002@infosec.pub to c/privacy@programming.dev

Paywall Bypass Link https://archive.is/2Wlz9

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submitted 3 months ago by Blaze@quokk.au to c/privacy@programming.dev
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submitted 3 months ago by Blaze@quokk.au to c/privacy@programming.dev

Crime reduced by 10.5% during the pilot from October 2025 to March 2026, the Metropolitan Police says.

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Lawsuit in California, plaintiffs vs the Mouse, about facial recognition in theme parks.

“When American families and their children visit a theme park, let alone a brand that’s as ubiquitous as Disney, they shouldn’t sacrifice their privacy rights when they enter,” Yagman said in a statement. “And as facial recognition becomes more common, and it proliferates in public places, especially, it’s more important than ever that we protect people’s privacy rights, because there are civil rights implications and privacy implications to collecting someone’s biometric information, especially without adequate consent, which is what we’ve alleged.

Seems to be.. the Mouse provides a way to bypass those lines. But that way is obscure and unclear to guests. So most ppl don't even know it is happening. Let alone which lines can bypass it.

the park has small signs at some security checkpoints notifying guests of the facial recognition policy, “but the sign is adorned with red, green, yellow, and blue Mickey Mouse silhouettes and is very easy to miss.”

This tech is also common, maybe unavoidable? at many sporting events in the US now. Major stadiums, that sort of thing.

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I used to have uMatrix runing on my browser. It basically works like a firewall, preventing cookies, scripts and other stuff running on your browser without your consent.

It gives you much more control than uBlock, but it is also known for breaking websites if you don't set what you allow the browser to run properly. I remember it being quite tedious, as I had to go through the process of setting those things properly on each new website I was visiting.

Maybe some of you use it already, and would like to share the experience. Maybe others didn't know about it and would like to give it a try. Either way, I don't hear that many peopl talking about this tool, so I thought of sharing it here.

Have a wonderful day!

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submitted 3 months ago by cm0002@lemy.lol to c/privacy@programming.dev
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submitted 3 months ago by cm0002@infosec.pub to c/privacy@programming.dev

I’m excited to introduce Paperweight, a local-first open-source desktop app I’ve been building to help people understand and reduce their digital footprint.

Your inbox is a paper trail of every company that has ever had your data. Every account you created, every service you tried, every online purchase. It’s all connected to your email. Most people have 100+ accounts they’ve forgotten about, each a potential security, or privacy risk. For me the final push was the Odido data breach in the Netherlands. I hadn’t been a customer for more than 8 years, but all my data was still in their systems.

What it does:

  • Account inventory — Maps every company that has ever emailed you, with risks classifications and recommendations for action.
  • Bulk unsubscribe — Find and unsubscribe from any marketing and mailing lists (auto RFC 8058 where supported).
  • Breach alerts — Alerts when any company you’ve been in contact with has been breached (via HaveIBeenPwned).
  • GDPR requests — Generates pre-filled GDPR requests in multiple languages.

Supports Gmail, Outlook, Apple Mail, Proton (via Bridge) and any other email provider via IMAP.

Privacy approach:

Everything runs on your machine. Email content, credentials, and connection details never leave your device. No telemetry, no cloud sync, no analytics. The code is fully open source and auditable on GitHub.

Most alternatives in this space all require your to share your data through their services. Some of them have actually been caught selling your data. Paperweight is the only tool I’m aware of that does this entirely local and is open-source.

Website

By Developer @wslyvh@lemmy.ml

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First Photo TranscriptCultivate Learning

UNIVERSITY of WASHINGTON

Parent/Guardian Permission Form: Classroom Video Recording for Early Childhood Education Research

Dear Parent or Guardian,
Your child's classroom is participating in a research study led by Dr. Gail Joseph and the Cultivate Learning team at the University of Washington. The goal of this study is to better understand children's everyday learning experiences and to develop Al tools that can help assess classroom interaction quality. We are writing to ask for your permission to include your child in this study.

What Will Happen in the Classroom

With your permission, your child's lead teacher may wear a small teacher-worn camera that captures the teacher's approximate first-person perspective, and/or we may place a fixed video camera in the classroom. These videos simply capture the normal interactions between teachers and children during regular classroom activities. Recordings occur during morning program hours up to 150 minutes, up to 4 visits in one month. Your child will not be asked to do anything new or different. Their daily routine will stay exactly the same.

How Will the Video Recordings Be Used?

The video recordings may be used for the following purposes, but not limited to:

  1. Supporting Teachers Through Coaching and Al Tools. Videos will be used to develop and evaluate Al models for assessing classroom interaction quality. This involves multiple steps:
  • Human coding: Trained research staff will watch and code videos using validated classroom observation tools to evaluate the quality of teacher-child interactions.
  • Human-coded data from these videos will be used to train and improve Al models so they can more accurately identify high-quality teaching practices over time. Al tools will also analyze the same recordings to generate codes and justifications. Only the research team uses these coded videos to train secure, private Al models.
  • Teaching summary: After all recording sessions and coding are complete, teachers will receive a written observation summary based on human-coded scores, reviewed by a member of the research team.
  1. Research on Children's Learning Experiences. Video data will be used to study how individual children experience their classroom environment, including how often they interact with teachers and the quality of those interactions. This research aims to better understand what supports positive learning outcomes for young children. This may help your child's teacher provide the best classroom experiences to nurture your child's growth and learning.
  2. Research Publications & Conference Presentations. Short clips or images may be included in academic publications or presented at professional conferences to illustrate study findings. Children's identities will be protected whenever possible by using blurring faces and editing out the child's name in the audio.
  3. Project Demonstration Videos. Brief clips may be used in videos that explain how the Al system works. These clips will not publicly identify your child, and will be selected with care to respect children's privacy.
  4. Restricted-Access Research Dataset. Clips or related data may be shared in a secure, restricted research dataset to support future early childhood education research.

Second Photo Transcript

Al Processing and Data Security

Video data may be processed using cloud-based Al services. These services are accessed through restricted, authenticated API credentials and are governed by commercial data processing agreements that prohibit the use of submitted data for model training or product improvement. The specific Al tools and models used may evolve over the course of the study as technology advances; any such tools will be subject to equivalent or stronger data protection commitments. These tools do not publicly share, post, or reuse your child's data for any reason. Data may be retained by the provider for a limited period (e.g., up to 55 days) solely for internal monitoring, after which it is deleted. All video data is stored and managed in accordance with University of Washington data security policies.

Only authorized research team members and individuals from the UW or other agencies that may need to audit study records will be given access to identifiable video data. All activities comply with UW Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and applicable FERPA regulations.

Video recordings of your child will never be posted online, shared publicly, or used for marketing. They are only for the research purposes described above. However, it is possible that someone who is not authorized to view the videos or study data will accidentally gain access to them despite our best efforts to protect your child's privacy.

Research staff are required by Washington State law to report any evidence of child abuse or neglect to the appropriate authorities.

The information that we obtain from your child for this study might be used for future studies. We may remove anything that might identify your child from the information. If we do so, the information may then be used for future research studies or given to another investigator without getting additional permission from you. It is also possible that in the future we may want to use or share study information that might identify your child. If we do, a review board will decide whether or not we need to get additional permission from you.

Your Rights

  • Participation is completely voluntary. You may decline or withdraw your child from the research at any time. Your decision will not affect your child's enrollment or standing in the program. - If you change your mind, simply let the teacher or research team know, and we will remove any recordings that include your child. Please note that if recordings have already been used in Al model training or grouped with other data prior to your withdrawal request, it may not be possible to remove your child's data**.

The document present participation as "completely voluntary" despite relying on an opt-out rather than an opt-in model. This raised logistical concerns among parents, with one noting they only discovered through questioning that opted-out children would wear stickers, leaving it unclear if they would still be filmed. Addressing these concerns, University of Washington News assistant director Jackson Holtz clarified that a single family's decision to opt out would actually exclude their entire classroom from the research. Ultimately, Holtz stated that this initial outreach was designed to gauge parent sentiment on AI, and based on the early negative feedback received, the university has entirely terminated the study and is notifying all participating sites. The university had taken down the section of its website describing the study, After 404 Media contacted them for comment.

Leak Source: 404 Media.

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spoilerIs meme, not real (...yet)

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submitted 3 months ago by cm0002@toast.ooo to c/privacy@programming.dev

Signal is drawing a hard line on the federal government’s proposed surveillance legislation: comply with Bill C-22 or leave the country. The secure messaging app says it would rather ditch the Canadian market than be forced to weaken the privacy protections it has built its reputation on. In an interview with The Globe and Mail

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submitted 3 months ago by Sunshine@piefed.ca to c/privacy@programming.dev
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