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submitted 5 months ago by Sunshine@piefed.ca to c/privacy@programming.dev
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Auf YouTube findest du die angesagtesten Videos und Tracks. Außerdem kannst du eigene Inhalte hochladen und mit Freunden oder gleich der ganzen Welt teilen.

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submitted 5 months ago by Sunshine@piefed.ca to c/privacy@programming.dev
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submitted 5 months ago by cm0002@europe.pub to c/privacy@programming.dev

Paper by,

Simon Lermen, Daniel Paleka, Joshua Swanson, Michael Aerni, Nicholas Carlini, Florian Tramèr

It talks about deanonymizing those who writes under a pseudonym. Sites like reddit, lemmy would be that type.

From the paper,

Given two databases of pseudonymous individuals, each containing unstructured text written by or about that individual, we implement a scalable attack pipeline that uses LLMs to: (1) extract identity-relevant features, (2) search for candidate matches via semantic embeddings, and (3) reason over top candidates to verify matches and reduce false positives.

Our results show that the practical obscurity protecting pseudonymous users online no longer holds and that threat models for online privacy need to be reconsidered.

They can match writing styles, interests, details to infer a job or city, or other unstructured information. That allows to match unrelated pseudonyms to the same person. Like, FooFighterGroupie and Yolanda43905 are the same human, despite they never said it. It can allow also, to match a pseudonym to a real identity across sites. Like someone posted on LinkedIn with a real name. It takes less info than most people expect, to figure out Julia Greenberg of Cedarville, NH is FooFighterGroupie.

You can protect yourself by never giving away much info. But ofc sometimes that's the whole point! Think talking about specific hobbies or w/e, gives away info. Also change up writing styles + vocab use, b/c it is a unique fingerprint.

I doubt this technique is used in a dragnet way... YET! But no reason it can't scale, if the cost of resources goes low enough. We could eventually see it become standard, analysis to link people across sites and identities.

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submitted 5 months ago by cm0002@europe.pub to c/privacy@programming.dev

Mar 26, 2026 9:32 AM

Using a VPN May Subject You to NSA Spying

US lawmakers are pressing Tulsi Gabbard to reveal whether using a VPN can strip Americans of their constitutional protections against warrantless surveillance

Six Democratic lawmakers are pressing the nation's top intelligence official to publicly disclose whether Americans who use commercial VPN services risk being treated as foreigners under United States surveillance law—a classification that would strip them of constitutional protections against warrantless government spying.

In a letter sent Thursday to Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, the lawmakers say that because VPNs obscure a user's true location, and because intelligence agencies presume that communications of unknown origin are foreign, Americans may be inadvertently waiving the privacy protections they're entitled to under the law.

Several federal agencies, including the FBI, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Trade Commission, have recommended that consumers use VPNs to protect their privacy. But following that advice may inadvertently cost Americans the very protections they're seeking.

The letter was signed by members of the Democratic Party’s progressive flank: Senators Ron Wyden, Elizabeth Warren, Edward Markey, and Alex Padilla, along with Representatives Pramila Jayapal and Sara Jacobs.

The concern centers on how intelligence agencies treat internet traffic routed through commercial VPN servers, which may be located anywhere in the world. Millions of Americans use these services routinely, whether to access region-restricted content like overseas sports broadcasts or to protect their privacy on public Wi-Fi networks. Because VPN servers commingle traffic from users in many countries, a single server—even one located in the United States—may carry communications from foreigners, potentially making it a target for surveillance under authorities that allow the government to secretly compel service from US service providers.

Under a controversial warrantless surveillance program, the US government intercepts vast quantities of electronic communications belonging to people overseas. The program also sweeps in enormous volumes of private messages belonging to Americans, which the FBI may search without a warrant, even though it is authorized to target only foreigners abroad.

The program, authorized under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, is set to expire next month and has become the subject of a fierce battle in Congress over whether it should be renewed without significant reforms to protect Americans' privacy.

Thursday’s letter points to declassified intelligence community guidelines that establish a default presumption at the heart of the lawmakers' concern: Under the NSA's targeting procedures, a person whose location is unknown is presumed to be a non-US person unless there is specific information to the contrary. Department of Defense procedures governing signals intelligence activities contain the same presumption.

Commercial VPN services work by routing a user's internet traffic through servers operated by the VPN company, which may be located anywhere in the world. A single server may carry traffic from thousands of users simultaneously, all of it appearing to originate from the same IP address. To an intelligence agency collecting communications in bulk, an American connected to a VPN server in, say, Amsterdam looks no different from a Dutch citizen.

The letter does not assert that Americans' VPN traffic has been collected under these authorities—that information would be classified—but asks Gabbard to publicly clarify what impact, if any, VPN use has on Americans' privacy rights.

Among those pressing the question is Wyden, who as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has access to classified details about how these surveillance programs operate and has a well-documented history of using carefully worded public statements to draw attention to surveillance practices he is unable to discuss openly.

The letter also raises concerns about a second, broader surveillance authority: Executive Order 12333, a Reagan-era directive that governs much of the intelligence community's foreign surveillance operations and permits the bulk collection of foreigners' communications with even fewer constraints than Section 702.

While 702 is a statute with congressional oversight that requires approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, EO 12333 surveillance operates under guidelines approved by the US attorney general alone.

The letter warns that the same foreignness presumption applies under both authorities, meaning Americans on foreign VPN servers could be exposed not just to targeted collection under 702 but to what the lawmakers describe as “bulk, indiscriminate surveillance of foreigners' communications.”

Americans spend billions of dollars each year on commercial VPN services, many offered by foreign-headquartered companies that route traffic through servers located overseas. The letter notes that these services are widely advertised as privacy tools, including by elements of the US government itself.

Despite the scale of the market, the letter suggests consumers have been given no meaningful guidance on how to protect themselves.

The lawmakers urge Gabbard to “clarify what, if anything, American consumers can do to ensure they receive the privacy protections they are entitled to under the law and the US Constitution.”

Updated at 12:38 pm ET, March 26, 2026: This story has been updated with additional details to clarify the scope of the potential surveillance addressed in the letter.

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submitted 5 months ago by cm0002@europe.pub to c/privacy@programming.dev

There are at least a dozen people spending at least several hours attacking GrapheneOS across platforms on a daily basis. It's a very strange situation. How do these people have so much time and dedication to keep making posts across platforms attacking us? It's relentless.

Every day, dozens of new accounts join our chat rooms to spread the same fabrications about GrapheneOS including via direct messages.

On Hacker News, one of the accounts making personal attacks based on fabrications in most threads about GrapheneOS has been doing it for 8 years.

Y Combinator has a financial stake in numerous surveillance and exploit development companies. Hacker News is a platform they own and the moderators on it have permitted years of vile harassment towards our team which they'd normally remove if others were targeted.

Hacker News mods micromanage it enough to repeatedly ask us not to reuse a bit of text across our comments. Meanwhile, they do nothing about disgusting personal attacks and harassment content consistently being spread in threads about GrapheneOS on their heavily moderated site.

The largest privacy community on Reddit /r/privacy bans any discussion or mentions of GrapheneOS. A bot automatically removes any post mentioning GrapheneOS they'll very actively ban people who evade their filters. The mods of the subreddit misrepresent this as something we want.

Many privacy subreddits have mods who are hostile towards GrapheneOS. We were banned from posting on /r/Android for multiple years. The mod who banned us said our official project account on Reddit was ban evading because they once unjustifiably banned one of our team members.

On Wikipedia, a company attacking GrapheneOS project made years of edits to the site pushing false narratives about us. They cited articles based on their own press releases. Other content was made paraphrasing Wikipedia which ended up being cited by it. It continues to this day.

Articles about GrapheneOS on most platforms often have comments engaging in baseless personal attacks towards our team, linking to harassment content and making many clearly inaccurate claims about it. We've found chat rooms coordinating this including attacks on the X platform.

Privacy projects are more vulnerable to these attacks because the userbase and supporters largely avoid social media and other platforms where it happens. Many people believe what they read on social media if it isn't countered and it builds echo chambers hostile to GrapheneOS.

Many people think these must be state sponsored attacks. However, our experience is these attacks are primarily orchestrated by companies selling dubious products marketed as private and secure. We did get targeted by state sponsored smear campaigns in France and Spain though

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I have been testing Tor Browser and Mullvad Browser using fingerprint.com. I get unique persistent identifiers that are unique per machine and persist over rebooting sessions. Javascript was on during this test.

This could be very dangerous to people using Tor Browser and Mullvad Browser.

For example, if someone visits Rainbow Railroad, an organization for leaving repressive countries with hostile LGBT policies, and then watches a video about the organization on YouTube, and then also does something, like create a Discord Server, and use Tor Browser to get around geoblocking but link it to their personal phone number, then a hostile regime buying data from data brokers could possible determine that user is considering using rainbow railroad. Even if this exact example isn't realistic or plausible (although governments do buy form data brokers), users should be aware that persistent identifiers in Tor Browser and Mullvad Browser allow for continuous tracking of a user using the same machine.

I posted this information on privacyguides forum and they deleted my account after, leading me to wonder if the forum is a giant honeypot that curates acceptable privacy discussions and unacceptable private discussions. I honestly wonder if they are infiltrated by the government. They repeatedly delete the posts of other people as well and the whole thing is starting to not sit well with me

OC write up by @someone@lemmy.today

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submitted 5 months ago by Sepia@mander.xyz to c/privacy@programming.dev

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/49367302

Hong Kong police can now demand phone or computer passwords from those who are suspected of breaching the wide-ranging National Security Law (NSL).

Those who refuse could face up to a year in jail and a fine of up to HK$100,000 ($12,700; £9,600), and individuals who provide "false or misleading information" could face up to three years in jail.

It comes as part of new amendments to a bylaw under the NSL that the government gazetted on Monday.

The NSL was introduced in Hong Kong in 2020, in wake of massive pro-democracy protests the year before. Authorities say the laws, which target acts like terrorism and secession, are necessary for stability - but critics say they are tools to quash dissent.

The new amendments also give customs officials the power to seize items that they deem to "have seditious intention".

Monday's amendments ensure that "activities endangering national security can be effectively prevented, suppressed and punished, and at the same time the lawful rights and interests of individuals and organisations are adequately protected", Hong Kong authorities said on Monday.

...

The city has seen the arrests of hundreds of protesters, activists and former opposition lawmakers since the introduction of the NSL.

...

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submitted 5 months ago by floofloof@lemmy.ca to c/privacy@programming.dev
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submitted 5 months ago by Blaze@piefed.zip to c/privacy@programming.dev
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submitted 5 months ago by Blaze@piefed.zip to c/privacy@programming.dev

An investigation by journalists working with Republik magazine may have struck a nerve by suggesting the company has failed in Switzerland

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