Not sure if this was posted here or somewhere else but here's the full translated text from the column written by Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) Oleksandr Syrsky in his apology to former Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov
https://militarnyi.com/uk/articles/moya-robota-vijna/
Translated locally using lm studio / gemma 4 26b then reviewed by a human (me):
To be honest: I am not interested in media work. I am not building an image, nor do I have political ambitions. I am fighting the war. 24/7. That is why I rarely give interviews and almost never write columns.
However, in recent days, my silence has been interpreted as consent. A whole mythology regarding conflicts and sabotage has grown around the Army and the General Staff. Therefore, I will say everything myself, once.
On the "conflict"
It was a surprise to learn that there was a conflict between us and the Minister. I perceived our relationship as professional: involving difficult issues and differing positions. This is how it ought to be between two institutions during a major war.
If I have offended anyone: Mykhailo Albertovych, I apologise. I can be harsh. But I ask you, and everyone currently following this story with fascination: let us focus not on the personal, but on the global. On victory.
There is a thought more important than any names: Ukraine is greater than Fedorov, Syrskyi, or any of us. Ukraine will stand not because it has indispensable people, but because it has an army, institutions, and millions of people doing their jobs. Reducing this war to a confrontation between two individuals is the greatest service we can provide to the enemy.
And this does not only apply to us and Minister Fedorov. I see people dividing into "the Fedorov camp" and "the Syrskyi camp". As soon as an issue related to the war or the military becomes politicised, it is simplified into a slogan. Yet every issue currently being debated online—contracts, procurement, mobilisation—is far more complex than any post about it. Decisions that determine people's lives are not made with slogans.
And here is a second thought, from which everything I say next follows: war is won by real work, not by the public drama surrounding it. Therefore, what follows is not about relationships, but about work.
Who is responsible for what
Let us start with the basics that have been lost in the discussion.
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for military supply, procurement, policy-making, and civilian control over the Armed Forces. This is a massive undertaking, without which the army cannot fight. The Minister is not required to be at the front line, nor is he meant to be a war strategist. That is neither his task nor his responsibility.
War strategy, operational planning, and the situation at the front fall, by law, under my responsibility to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Long-range strikes and the isolation of Crimea are handled by the Armed Forces, the SBU, the GUR, and the State Border Guard Service, and are coordinated by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and myself. This is not because I am "blocking" anyone from success, but because this is how institutional processes are structured in all the world's armies.
When I am accused of a "lack of strategy", let me remind you of a simple fact: war strategy is not a public document or a social media post. It is reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and its results are visible on the front, where a million-man army has been holding back a superior enemy for four years. Anyone demanding that the Commander-in-Chief "present a strategy" publicly is demanding that he present it to the enemy.
Lately, there has been much talk about "vision". A vision is useful: you can build a startup with a vision. But for victory in a war, you need a strategy. A vision paints a desired future. A strategy answers the questions of where to find the reserves, ammunition, people, and time to reach that future.
And on the subject of "micromanagement": I have served in the army for over 40 years. I am an army man: I do not issue ultimatums to my superior, nor do I command troops via messengers. A million-man army is not commanded via WhatsApp. It is commanded through headquarters, orders, and the responsibility of commanders on the ground. One recent decision: I delegated authority to corps commanders, specifically regarding the transfer of servicemen within corps. This is the very opposite of micromanagement.
On drones
The strangest accusation I have heard is that I somehow "do not want to fight with drones".
The Unmanned Systems Forces as a separate branch of the military was created under my watch. I personally submitted the candidacy of Madyar to the President to head the SBS. It was an unpopular decision, and I took full responsibility for it. Why him? Because he did not just rise from soldier to officer, but created a unique unit and possesses vision. We all see the results every day.
A person who "does not want to fight with drones" does not create the world's first separate branch of Unmanned Systems Forces and does not appoint a commander to it in defiance of all military hierarchy traditions.
However, I must also tell the second part of the truth, because the results on the battlefield legally fall on me. Drones today account for a large proportion of hits. That is a fact. But to prepare the battlefield for the effective use of drones, you need artillery, mortars, engineering equipment, air defence, electronic warfare, and dozens of other types of supplies. The General Staff submits a full list of what is required for war to the Ministry. We must procure everything, not just what is currently trending.
We are not fighting a hypothetical small country. We are facing an enemy that is superior in every way, and who fights specifically with artillery, aviation, and infantry. I cannot turn a million-man army "to drones" in two months and say: "this is how we fight now." Aside from the fact that this would be an obvious gamble, any experiment of this scale is paid for with our land and our people.
On personnel
It is said that I only promote "loyalists". Look at the facts. Madyar. Apostol. Gnatov. Andriy Biletskyi. Redis. Veres. Achilles. Yevhen Karas. This list could go on. These are people who rose from junior officers to leadership positions. I appoint them, I promote them, and I mentor them. Many of these appointments were unpopular within the system. I made them because my only criterion is results.
Yes, transfer procedures are long and complex. However, these procedures are defined by regulations that were developed long before me, and the Ministry is the body that must change them. I will support any simplification that does not destroy the command structure of the troops.
On administrative work
I will not resort to personal attacks. I will speak only of facts, because they concern the motivation of a million people in the military.
The new contracts were presented over a month ago. As of today, approximately 2,000 servicemen in a million-man army have signed them. At the same time, I have received a large number of demotivated soldiers and officers who expected one set of conditions but received another. The very resolution regarding the "experiment" raises serious legal questions. Compare this: the increase in pay within the Ministry of Internal Affairs was carried out through budget amendments and through the Verkhovna Rada. That is the difference between a decision and a presentation. Presentations must not turn into self-promotion: behind every slide, there must be a document, a budget, and a procedure. Otherwise, instead of a decision, the army receives disappointment.
The same applies to the mobilisation reform—a task set by the President. The Ground Forces and the Territorial Recruitment Centres are under my vertical, and we are ready for change: we attend every session in the Verkhovna Rada, we report all violations to the SBI, and we insist on the involvement of the police. But the reform itself is the legislative and administrative work of the Ministry. I am waiting for it just as the whole country is.
And finally, something I have no right to remain silent about—pay. The Minister himself stated publicly that part of the funds from soldiers' salaries was diverted to purchasing drones. Because of this, questions have arisen regarding the funding of payments for the second half of the year.
I will say it plainly: a soldier's salary is not a reserve for reallocation; it is the state's obligation to the people who risk their lives every day. Together with the Government, we are currently seeking a solution so that every serviceman receives what is owed to them, on time and in full. There is simply no other option. But a lesson must be learned for the future: decisions involving billions must not be made without calculating the consequences for a million people.
I will state separately: this column is not for those arguing on social media. It is for those who carry the burden of war every day. Our warriors do not care who won an argument on the internet. They need ammunition, rotation, timely pay, and the certainty that the state is working behind their backs, not fighting amongst itself. Everything I have written above is about that.
In conclusion
I am not fighting the Ministry. I am fighting Russia. The General Staff has never opposed the Ministry: we have cooperated and will continue to cooperate with any Minister appointed by the state. In the army, you do not choose who you serve with. In the army, you follow orders and do your job. But you do it well.
My job is the war. Strategy, the front, the people. That is what I have been doing, and what I will continue to do. Preferably without interviews and columns.
Ukraine is greater than any names. And Ukraine will stand if everyone does their job in their own place.
