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this post was submitted on 20 Sep 2026
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TechTakes
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Big brain tech dude got yet another clueless take over at HackerNews etc? Here's the place to vent. Orange site, VC foolishness, all welcome.
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This is a plausible explanation, but I am surprised that this git behavior is not more well-known as there have been multiple discussion about "supply-chain attacks" even before LLMs became widespread.
Fwiw a similar problem is well-known in e.g. GitHub Actions even without this confusion.
You can have your GHA scripts use "actions" written by other people, and the way you refer to them is
user/repo@commit, where the commit can be a commit ID or a branch name or a tag name. The docs actually recommend pinning to commit IDs, but in practice most people actually pin to tags, likebob/doit@v1because that will auto-update if bob fixes some bug and updates v1 to point to that. But if bob goes rogue, or gets compromised, the attacker could change the tag v1 to point to a malicious commit, though, hence the recommendation to use commit IDs for all actions that you didn't write yourself. I don't know if this ref/ID confusion can be exploited on GHA, but I would expect the answer is no, because GitHub Actions doesn't launch git shell commands like a savage, but idk