You're really mixing up a lot of stuff

I don't think I am. I'm just describing a broad definition of property, as a descriptivist/positivist argument, observing that this broad definition already applies in most modern legal systems.

For instance, the fact that something can be sold doesn't mean it's a form of property.

If we want to get into the philosophical underpinnings of what rights do or don't qualify as property, I'm just describing the legal frameworks that already apply. Pretty much anything that can be sold (or leased or licensed or conveyed in a will) counts as property. Lots of these rights are intangible, including the broad sets of rights under patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret law that we describe as "intellectual property."

Property, by its nature, includes the right to exclude others from enjoyment or profit that arise from that property. And it doesn't require the consent of the excluded. Some argue that the concept of property itself is theft, for that reason.

But libertarians generally support strong property rights, and I'd argue it's consistent with that view to support strong intellectual property rights (whether administered by a government or not).