The transition from movement to combined-arms maneuver is the essence of the breakthrough. It requires formations that can sustain tempo, absorb friction, and exploit opportunity faster than the defender can respond. During the breakthrough, tempo determines whether a penetration becomes a rupture—forces must expand the breach faster than the enemy can reposition reserves or restore defensive coherence.
Maintaining this tempo requires significant combat power and resources, as sustained pressure overwhelms the enemy’s ability to respond. In the modern context, that role belongs to armored combined-arms formations. Armored formations possess the mobility, layered protection, direct and indirect firepower, and beyond-line-of-sight command and control necessary to operate at depth and tempo. Armored forces are designed to continue the attack, turning local success into operational dislocation.
Infantry forces, meanwhile, play a critical role in the breakthrough. Specifically, these formation types hold the door open, preventing the enemy from closing it and creating a salient in which armored forces become encircled, and ultimately, destroyed. Infantry forces, with joint fires and engineer support, seize key intersections, block cross-mobility corridors, and deny enemy observation from restricted terrain. By doing so, they stabilize the penetration, protect their flanks, and preserve momentum.
When properly concentrated and aligned in time and space, armored and infantry combined-arms formations do more than penetrate—they break through with the required tempo to rupture the enemy’s defense in depth. In doing so, they transform a foothold into a rupture. But rupture alone does not produce decision; it must be exploited before the enemy can recover.
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Many current observers have fallen into the same trap, trying to replicate Ukraine’s success by swapping a Maginot Line for a hyperfocus on mass-producing drones. Drones should not be treated as a stand-alone solution, but as enablers within a larger operational framework. When properly integrated, they extend the formation’s ability to see, strike, and sustain across depth—supporting each phase of the operation rather than defining it.
Counterdrone efforts are also essential for survival on the modern battlefield, reducing exposure and preserving freedom of action under persistent surveillance. But they are not a cure-all; suppressing enemy drones alone will not restore maneuver or reconnect tactical success to strategic decision. Drone-enabled defenses have proven lethal but primarily in static conditions. They excel at denial, not decision. Replicating them while on the move is difficult. Focusing solely on drone warfare alone risks reinforcing the very dynamics that produce stalemate.
If you are wondering what the big fuss about Operation Vivaldi is about well gestures at article there you go. This is being proven and demonstrated in realtime and the details are only beginning to trickle out... which I am NOT meaning to say that a strategic breakthrough has been achieved in russian frontlines, rather Ukraine is proving its chops at being able to sustainably conduct these kinds of armored maneuvers with manned and unmanned platforms that facilitate breaking stalemates decisively.
also see https://mwi.westpoint.edu/autonomy-will-not-automatically-change-how-an-army-brigade-fights-autonomy-at-scale-will/
Today, soldiers largely operate or supervise individual robotic systems. That model will not scale. A brigade cannot add dozens of autonomous systems if each requires another operator, screen, and continuous stream of instructions.
The near-term transition will likely be mixed. Commanders will integrate manned formations with remotely operated and increasingly autonomous ground and aerial systems. Different systems may conduct reconnaissance, carry payloads, move supplies, provide communications relay, or contribute other effects while soldiers and leaders coordinate them as part of the combined arms fight.
Ukraine is beginning to demonstrate what this intermediate stage can look like, even though the systems themselves remain largely remote controlled. In December 2024 near the city of Hlyboke, Ukraine’s Khartiia Brigade used more than fifty aerial and ground unmanned systems to perform different functions as part of a coordinated operation. The systems did not independently replace the combined arms formation; soldiers were still required to secure and hold terrain. The significance was not the autonomy, but the ability to coordinate multiple unmanned capabilities against the same tactical problem.