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The original was posted on /r/ufos by /u/Brad12d3 on 2024-09-16 14:07:51+00:00.
It seems like many people don’t fully grasp how large organizations, especially government agencies, operate.
I work at a large company with numerous departments. There are literally hundreds of people in the same building who don’t know me or what I do, and vice versa. If I discovered my manager was embezzling a significant amount of money, I would report it to HR. The HR team might know who my manager is and understand their role, but that doesn’t mean they know them personally or condone their actions.
In this scenario, I’m effectively blowing the whistle on wrongdoing within my department by reporting it to another part of the company. If the media got hold of the story and wanted to interview me, our legal team would probably review my statements to ensure I don’t disclose sensitive details, like how my manager exploited the company’s systems to steal money. Revealing certain specifics could open the company up to legal or financial liability.
I could still speak to the media about the issue and tell the truth, but I wouldn’t reveal details that could further harm the company.
This parallels what happens in the government when a former intelligence officer like Lue Elizondo or David Grusch wants to talk publicly about classified programs, like those dealing with UAPs (Unidentified Aerial Phenomena). Before they can share any information with the public, they have to go through a formal review process with the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR).
This office isn’t run by people trying to protect secret UAP programs. Their job is purely administrative—they just ensure that any disclosures won’t reveal classified information that could harm national security. They don’t care what an individual is trying to say as long as it doesn’t compromise legally sensitive or classified details. So, for example, when Lue Elizondo submitted his book manuscript about his work in the Pentagon’s UAP programs, DOPSR reviewed it to ensure he wasn’t revealing anything that could jeopardize intelligence operations or military security.
Similarly, when David Grusch wanted to talk about SAPs (Special Access Programs) allegedly reverse-engineering UAPs, his statements went through DOPSR to ensure no classified info was leaked. But here’s the critical part: if someone within the government wanted to suppress Grusch's information because it exposed an illegal program or other sensitive activity, they would have to provide a legitimate reason for censoring it.
For instance, if Grusch submitted talking points saying, “I believe there’s a secret SAP reverse-engineering UAP technology,” and the DOPSR review rejected it, they’d need to justify why that particular information was too sensitive to disclose. In many cases, this could raise more red flags than simply letting him speak, especially if the information is already stigmatized and easily discredited in the public eye. By trying to block these disclosures, it could inadvertently draw more attention to the program in question, potentially looking far more suspicious than just letting him speak and then attempting to discredit him afterward.
In other words, it’s not like the people reviewing these disclosures are involved in the conspiracy themselves. They’re more like gatekeepers ensuring no one accidentally lets classified material slip. If someone were to actively block Grusch or Elizondo from speaking, they’d need a clear reason tied to national security—anything else would be incredibly hard to justify, and could lead to deeper scrutiny into why certain details are being withheld.
So, just like in the corporate example, these review processes exist to protect sensitive information, but they don’t necessarily serve the interests of concealing deeper corruption or wrongdoing. If something illegal or unethical is happening in the background, it’s often hidden from the very people conducting these reviews.