I run a small DMARC SaaS, so the "550 5.7.1 Message rejected: Message lacks SPF/DKIM/DMARC Auth Records (AS9031519)" bounces took over my week. Microsoft has since called it a fault and rolled it back. Here is what I pieced together from Microsoft's bulletin, the Microsoft Q&A threads and a few operators' logs, plus the part that still needs doing. ๐ช๐ต๐ฎ๐ ๐ ๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ผ๐ณ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ถ๐ฑ Service Health incident EX1545193 (tenant admins only): "A recent update to the spam enforcement rules caused email messages to be incorrectly marked and blocked, which led to impact." Window: Nov 6 18:00 UTC to Nov 9 11:02 UTC. The bulletin never mentions DMARC, and it expands SPF as "Service Provider Foundation". ๐๐ ๐๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ ๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฟ๐ผ๐๐ผ๐ณ๐'๐ ๐๐ถ๐ป๐ฑ๐ผ๐
- Nov 5: rejection appears in operator logs, "not once before that" (Mythic Beasts, MailRoute)
- Nov 6 06:19 UTC: earliest Microsoft Q&A report I found (Microsoft Q&A)
- Nov 6 09:39:53 UTC: bounce stamped by Microsoft's own server, AS9031519 included (Lazy Admin)
- Nov 6 18:00 UTC: Microsoft's stated start (EX1545193)
- Nov 9 11:02 UTC: Microsoft's stated end (EX1545193)
A log search that starts at Microsoft's start misses Nov 5 and the morning of Nov 6.
๐ช๐ต๐ ๐ ๐ฏ๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ก๐๐ฅ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ถ๐ฑ "๐ฆ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฃ๐ผ๐น๐ถ๐ฐ๐ ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐บ๐ฒ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐ธ ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐น๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป"
M365 senders got
550 5.7.23 The message was rejected because of Sender Policy Framework violation -> 550 5.7.1 Message rejected: .... 5.7.23 is in Exchange Online's own NDR table; Postfix and Zoho senders only ever saw the raw 5.7.1. My reading: the SPF wording came from Exchange Online's NDR, not from a failed SPF check. Microsoft hasn't said it in those words. ๐ช๐ต๐ ๐๐ผ๐บ๐ฒ ๐ต๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ถ๐ฑ ๐ฑ๐บ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฐ=๐ฝ๐ฎ๐๐ ๐๐ถ๐๐ต ๐ป๐ผ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฑ Microsoft writesdmarc=bestguesspasswhen no DMARC record exists ("If the domain had a DMARC TXT record, the DMARC check for the message would pass."). That is most likely what the "but my headers say pass" posts were reading. Check DNS instead:dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com. ๐๐ ๐๐ฎ๐๐ป'๐ ๐๐ ๐๐ฅ๐ ๐ฒ๐ป๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐บ๐ฒ๐ป๐ RFC 9989 ยง4.10.1: with no policy record, receivers "MUST NOT apply the DMARC mechanism". This was Outlook.com's own filtering. The Postmaster policies still only strongly recommend DMARC below 5,000 emails a day. ๐ช๐ต๐ฎ๐ ๐๐๐ถ๐น๐น ๐ป๐ฒ๐ฒ๐ฑ๐ ๐ฑ๐ผ๐ถ๐ป๐ด- Find the bounces from Nov 5 00:00 UTC to Nov 9 11:02 UTC. Match the text, not the code: 5.7.1 is generic, and day one had no AS9031519 suffix. - Postfix (current and rotated logs):
zgrep -h 'Message lacks SPF/DKIM/DMARC Auth Records' /var/log/mail.log* | grep -o 'to=<[^>]*>' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn - M365: EAC โ Mail flow โ Message trace, recipients
*@outlook.com,*@hotmail.com,*@live.com,*@msn.com(one wildcard per value), delivery status Failed. Trace reaches back 90 days. - Resend what matters. It was a 550, so nothing was retried.
- Keep the emergency
p=noneand addrua=so you get aggregate reports.
๐ช๐ต๐ฎ๐ ๐ ๐ฑ๐ผ๐ป'๐ ๐ธ๐ป๐ผ๐ Some people said they bounced with SPF, DKIM and DMARC all in place. Unverified, and several Q&A cases turned out to have no record after all. Nobody publicly tested a domain with a DMARC record but no aligned SPF or DKIM. If that's you, keep the bounce and the headers before changing anything. Happy to look at a redacted bounce if yours doesn't fit any of this. Full write-up with all four bounce forms, the sources and the timeline: https://dmarcguard.io/blog/outlook-as9031519-dmarc-bounce/