...
For decades, Russia has been one of the few major powers that India could count on to help counterbalance China. The bilateral relationship amounted to a buffer and a hedge, ensuring that instead of being squeezed by its larger neighbor, India retained some geopolitical room to maneuver. But this system cannot work if Russia is hollowed out and dependent on China. And that is precisely the outcome the Ukraine war has produced.
...
After its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, ... China also became Russia’s biggest trading partner and an increasingly important source of the machinery, electronics and industrial goods Russia could no longer buy from the West.
This outcome diverges sharply from the “no limits” partnership of equals that Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin touted just before the war started. Russia is becoming a junior partner of China, which is just fine with Xi — and explains why he is in no hurry to force Putin to negotiate with Ukraine. While Xi pays lip service to a “political settlement,” he avoids putting any public pressure on Putin to seek peace.
...
The calculation is not mysterious. A prolonged war keeps Russia boxed in, and a boxed-in Russia has fewer alternatives — which means more leverage for China. And, as the stalled talks over the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline show, China is not shying away from using that leverage to advance its own interests.
...
China wants a Russia that is strong enough to be useful, but weak enough to remain dependent.
...
Removepaywall
The article is purely speculative. Their actual statements and actions are not significantly different. The author just thinks that China has an incentive to prolong the war, but there's no evidence to support that that's how China sees things.