Not necessarily without concern. Some containers have startup scripts that chown or chmod all files in some locations. It can mess up access for other containers if shared.

First will be shared files between the container in a single named volume. The others will create 2 named volumes pointing at different files with example1 from the 3rd not being on NFS.

From what I've read is not authentication bypass, it's a RCE using certificates to deliver the payload. If a specific signature is found it runs the code that was sent in place of the signing public key. It also means that only someone who has the ability to generate that specific key signature could use the RCE.

There were some other bits that looked like they could have been placed to enable compromising other build systems in the future when they checked for xz support.

I'n Windows it is not stored in a keyring but instead in the registry. This has basically the same security threat model as a local key file.

The ssh-agent on Linux will do what you want with effectively the same security. The biggest difference being that it doesn't run as a system service but instead runs in userspace which can make it easier to dump memory. There are some other agent services out there with additional security options but they don't change the threat model much.

My memory of the cp command is that attributes such as file times were transferred at the last step. I think this would make rsync safe in most situations where a system crash wasn't involved.

You can also use o1e as there are never more than a single shared character. It also doesn't change the string size so it can be done in place. Still an ugly hack of a solution.

I think I remember running into that as well but for whatever reason I couldn't get accelerated-x working with the opengl libraries I was using for school. Likely the issue was just a lack of understanding on my part as I don't think I had a good grasp of the Linux library loader until well after I graduated.

You may want to try hotter too if you haven't yet. Printing faster can sometimes require a bit of extra heat and too low can cause a different kind of stringing.

They fail because you can't trust a machine that an adversary has in their physical possession.

Software running on an untrusted computer can have code and memory injected or modified without modifying the executable files. Binary executable files are by necessity readable and someone with enough time can parse through them to fully deobfuscate and figure out what they are doing. Anti-anti-cheat systems basically perform the same code as the anti-cheat but slightly modify the result to hide the cheating. This can be done either by code swapping in the anti-cheat or at a higher level. If the anti-cheat system is looking at which processes are running then have the system feed it the real list of processes with the cheat processes removed... etc.

Trusted computing requires hardware level monitoring, validated certificates, and zero vulnerabilities since the time the certificate was provisioned. In addition, current technology would also require those base certificates to be regularly rotated and device decertified if it didn't rotate in time to prevent physical offline hardware attacks on the certificate data. Even game consoles don't have this level of platform trust and are often physically modified to enable cheating/piracy.

The only successful way to prevent most cheating is to run the simulation entirely server-side and then only send data to each client according to what they should know. Even then you won't be able to prevent assisted cheating like aim-bots or texture replacements.

You can still enter audit mode and change some registry settings to switch to a local account. Last time I did an 11 install on a device with Wi-Fi it also let me create a local account after trying to continue with a blank password a few times.

When rsync copying the active root I like to bind mount / to /mnt/root_fs first. This avoids the issue with needing to exclude folders with sub-mounts and will expose files to copy that might be hidden by the mounts.